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A Novel Calculus? Institutional
Change, Globalization and Industrial
Conflict in Europe
ABSTRACT ■ Collective industrial conflict in Europe has declined dramatically
since the 1970s. This decline is the result of significant changes in
institutional factors, influencing the calculations of employees and their
organizations when considering strike action. Declining union density and
changes in market protection seem major influences, while institutional and
legal changes are important explanations of persistent major inter-country
variance. This indicates a novel industrial conflict calculus for employees,
which entails a more restricted use, but not the withering away of the strike.
KEYWORDS: collective action ■ globalization ■ industrial conflict ■
institutionalism ■ strikes ■ trade unions
Introduction
In the 1970s, European employers and employees every year lost on
average almost 420 working days for every 1000 employees through
industrial conflict. In the 1980s this figure declined to 200, in the 1990s
to 56 and today seems to have stabilized at a level of just over 50 days lost,
little more than an eighth of the level in the strike-prone 1970s (Table 1).
In absolute figures, the number of working days lost (WDL) due to indus-
trial conflict has fallen from over 48 million in the 1970s to just 7.2 million
days today.
Part of the immediate explanation would seem to be the absence of very
large, prolonged and often politically motivated strikes, such as the British
miners’ strike in 1984–85 and the large strikes in Italy and Spain in the
1970s and 1980s. But the underlying trend for shorter and minor strikes
also seems to show a decline: in Denmark, for instance, disregarding large
conflicts in the period from 1970 to 2003, the level of WDL has dropped
from around 70 per 1000 employees per year to 40 (Scheuer, 2004: 6).
While researchers in the 1970s and early 1980s wrote about the
‘resurgence of class conflict’ (Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978) or ‘strikes . . .
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and class conflict in capitalist societies’ (Korpi and Shalev, 1979), sometimes
seemingly priding themselves on high strike levels on their own home turf,
such language seems to have evaporated. These days, when authors do turn
to the subject, titles come more in versions of ‘peace in Europe?’ (Edwards
and Hyman, 1994; cf. Shalev, 1992), ‘heroic defeats’ (Golden, 1997) and ‘the
worst record in Europe?’ (Rigby and Marco Aledo, 2001).
So have strikes really withered away? Are workers so content with
wages and conditions that strikes are no longer a reasonable option? Has
the working class simply disappeared as a political force, and the strike
with it, as some of the gloomiest pessimists will have it (for example
Crouch, 2004: 53–7)?3 Not quite.
First, newspapers still report spectacular strikes by workers faced with
companies outsourcing production lines to low-pay (or maybe just
lower-pay) countries. Whether protesting against EU regulations
allowing imports of cheaper commodities from inside or outside the EU,
against moving production lines to developing countries, against the
privatization of public enterprises and utilities, or against the closing of
factories following other restructuring measures by management, the
strike still seems to be one valid form of expression and protest for
employees (and not only for blue-collar workers).
Second, even if pay formation in many European countries has become
decentralized, making national bargaining less frequent, it still typically
takes the form of some kind of local collective bargaining, and these
bargaining processes still contain an impetus or a motivation for local
short-term strike activity, whether official or unofficial. Changes have
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(2)
144
TABLE 1. Average WDL per Year in 15 European Countries by Decade,
1970–2003
Period Dependent WDL (000) Simple Weighted
employment (000) average average
1970–79 115,342 48,280 351 419
1980–89 129,807 25,947 175 200
1990–99 147,640 8,278 70 56
2000–03 142,511 7,257 44 51
Note: Simple average is average of averages of countries (disregarding country size).
Weighted average is calculated on aggregate numbers, as shown in the table.
Countries are those with available data for almost the whole period: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Western Germany until 1993),
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom.
Data for Greece are incomplete, and for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
do not go back further than 1990.1 The data have been drawn from the Statistical
Yearbook of the International Labour Organization (ILO).2
Source: ILO.
taken place, but industrial conflict is definitely still a fact of life of
European employment relations. Why is this?
The Strike and the Right to Strike
In a classic formulation, the strike is ‘a temporary stoppage of work by
a group of employees in order to express a grievance or enforce a demand’
(Hyman, 1972: 17). All parts of the definition have significance:
• The strike is temporary: whatever the outcome, employees intend to
return to the same work, and the employer normally expects the same.
(Though a stoppage may become permanent if the strikers are laid off
or the company goes bankrupt.)
• The strike is a special type of collective action: if one individual stops
work as a protest, this is not considered a strike.
• It is a complete work stoppage, and therefore different from other
types of action such as working to rule or banning overtime.
• It is also important that we are talking about employees, since collective
action by other groups in society (for instance road blockades by French
wine growers protesting at cheap Italian or Spanish wine imports, or
class boycotts by students) are only referred to as strikes by analogy.
• Finally, the strike is not impulsive, but rather a kind of rational action
used to achieve something (to force through a demand, resist the
demand of the opponent or express a protest). Calculations may be
mostly on the part of strike or union leaders, while, for strikes, social-
normative or other non-rational motives may be at play: some union
leaders prefer fighting and losing to not fighting at all (Elster, 1989;
Golden, 1997; Kelly, 1998; Oskarsson, 2005).
Organized employees and their unions often emphasize that the right to
free collective bargaining implies the right to strike. This right has certainly
not always been recognized. One might say that, in general, dictators do
not like strikes: it is well known that it was just as illegal to strike in
Franco’s Spain as it was in the former Soviet Union, even though the ideo-
logical justifications differed. Democratic politicians do not generally like
them either, but they do not tend to outlaw them. In many cases, they do
the opposite, guaranteeing the right to strike. This may be connected with
the obvious role of strikes and popular revolts in protesting against unfair
political rule and demanding democratic governance (as in Poland, South
Africa and Zimbabwe in recent decades; see Novitz, 2003: 61).
Thus, it is most certainly not only unions and their members who
ascribe great significance to the right to strike (Novitz, 2003: 49–73). In
virtually every democratic state this right is recognized as fundamental,
even though this recognition has rather varying shapes and forms: in
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some countries the right is explicitly and specifically laid down in law,
sometimes in the Constitution (as for instance in France, Italy, Spain and
Sweden), while in other countries the right to strike emerges implicitly
from legal practice of the courts and the legislators. For instance in
Denmark, where the right to strike is not embedded in law, the general
view has been that what is not directly illegal is allowed.4 In the UK,
where there is also no formal right to strike, the situation is somewhat
different, since the common law underwrites the sanctity of the individ-
ual contract, which is breached by collective action in the form of a strike.
Strikes are therefore not legal except where the law specifically prescribes
an ‘immunity’ from the sanction of the courts (and this immunity has
been substantially reduced in the past quarter century).
Neither in Denmark nor the UK has the lack of legislation to safeguard
the right to strike prevented employees from striking. On the contrary,
over long periods of time these countries had high levels of strikes, and it
is therefore tempting to say that the difference between direct and indirect
rights to strike does not hold much significance. On the other hand, the
fact that in Germany, political strikes intended to influence government
or parliament are illegal would appear in part to explain why strike rates
are substantially and persistently lower than in France, Italy and Spain (see
later analysis). And in the UK, changes in legislation in the 1980s do seem
to have had an impact on industrial conflict (Elgar and Simpson, 1993).5
Strikes are not without costs (Crouch, 1982), for both parties to the
conflict and often for third parties too (a company’s subcontractors and
customers, patients, clients or pupils, even university students, and also
the families of the strikers and society in general). Some of these gener-
alized costs are among the reasons why legislators do restrict the use of
industrial conflict (Novitz, 2003: 75–88). Companies lose earnings and
possibly market share, employees lose their wages and unions lose the
money they spend on supporting the striking workers. Often the strike
is used as a threat which it is hoped will not be activated, certainly by
some groups of employees; however, deciding whether or not to strike is
never easy. Partly there are economic costs, as mentioned above; partly
there are social or human costs in the form of deterioration of the
relationship between striking employees and the managements, which
might cause long-term damage to the working environment.
As noted in the introduction, substantial change has taken place in
strike patterns, and in this article I shall attempt to diagnose some of the
changes involved and some of their implications. I undertake a macro-
comparative analysis of strikes in Europe between 1970 and 2003,
attempting to answer the following questions:
• What are the incidence and prevalence of strikes in Europe and how
radically are they declining?
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• Are national strike patterns converging or diverging?
• How can we explain the decline in strike activity and the new patterns
of industrial conflict?
• Is there a novel calculus emerging in industrial conflict, and what is its
implication for the future of strikes?
Methodology: Choice of Indicator
Fifteen European countries have been selected for comparative analyses,
and in the Figures that follow they have been grouped as follows:
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
British Isles: Ireland, United Kingdom
North-West Continental: Belgium, France, the Netherlands
Southern Continental: Italy, Portugal, Spain
Central Continental: Austria, Germany, Switzerland
The reason for this selection is that all these countries have good statis-
tics for all or most of the time period covered (1970 and onwards);
however, very small countries such as Iceland and Luxembourg have been
excluded. For Greece, data in the main do not exist, and for the countries
in central and eastern Europe, only some have strike data in the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) database and these data do not go
back further than 1990.6 The data have been drawn from the Statistical
Yearbook of the ILO.7
In interpreting these comparisons it is important to be aware that
national definitions of a stoppage of work vary significantly, as do criteria
for inclusion in the official statistics (the lower limit for duration,
numbers involved and/or WDL before a strike is counted) (EIRO, 2003;
Jackson, 1987; Monger, 2004; Stokke, 1999: 27; Stokke and Thörnqvist,
2001: 250–2; Walsh, 1983). In this article no attempt has been made to
compensate for these variations, since experience in so doing shows that
it does not make much difference when the focus is on WDL. In fact, the
ILO statistics are the generally acknowledged resource for this infor-
mation, despite these limitations. They cover the absolute number of
stoppages in each country, the number of workers involved, the number
of WDL as a result of industrial disputes and in most cases also the total
number of employees.
The three strike measures are used in various ways in the comparative
strike literature, depending on the particular theoretical interest of the
authors. Thus, several contributions look at how the number of strikes is
influenced, for example, by union organization (Clegg, 1976; Edwards
and Hyman, 1994; Mikkelsen, 1992; Morris, 2003). In this article,
however, the main focus is on how much industrial conflict ‘disturbs’ and
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intervenes in production itself,8 and, therefore, the third measure, WDL,
is used throughout (except in Table 2). This seems to be the preferred
indicator for most observers today (see the uses in Edwards and Hyman,
1994: 252; Monger, 2004; Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001: 248).
The reasons for this choice are that the number of disputes is typically
small, and not indicative of societal impact, because they vary so much in
size. While researchers have taken many different approaches to analyz-
ing the forms and shapes of strikes, it seems to this author that many of
the patterns found are spurious, and may be a function of variance in the
statistical reporting by the individual countries. Therefore, WDL is
assumed to be less affected by statistical measurement problems than the
other two measures, since differences in the reporting principles and
practices of the countries influence the ‘number of strikes’ measure much
more than that of WDL.
Industrial Conflict in Europe since 1970
What is the overall picture? Table 2 shows the proportion of employees
involved in industrial conflict, stated as annual averages for each decade
since 1970 (data for the present decade ending in 2003). This shows a
marked decline in most European countries since the 1970s, when indus-
trial conflict in most of the region reached a peak (see Crouch and
Pizzorno, 1978; and for Italy, Franzosi, 1995: 4–5). On average, 97
employees out of every 1000 (or almost 1 out of 10) took part in an
industrial conflict in the 1970s, while today, this figure is reduced to 27
of every 1000 (or one 1 of 37). This is true for the Scandinavian countries,
for Ireland and the UK, and also for some of the southern European
countries, especially Italy and Spain. The latter two countries had almost
twice the incidence of industrial conflict (both in terms of workers
involved and of WDL) as in northern Europe, so the decline is particu-
larly dramatic. It is also clear that in most countries in the centre of
(western) Europe the number of strikers is very low.
While there has been a substantial overall decline in strike participation,
the pattern cross-nationally is not all that different today from that in the
1970s: countries with most strikers then are in the main still at the top of
the league table. However, the variance has become significantly smaller
than in the 1970s. Whatever the causes may be, one cannot fail to conclude
that European industrial relations, as far as industrial conflict is concerned,
are moving significantly towards convergence, with patterns of strike
participation less differentiated than previously. Variations across EU15,
with the continuing exceptions of Italy and Spain (and probably also
Greece, for which adequate data do not exist), are today relatively small.
But they are still there, as will be discussed in the following sections.
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The five graphs in Figure 1 show WDL per country over the period
from 1970 to 2003, as far as data are available.9 In graph 1A for Scandi-
navia one sees that Finland had until 1986 a substantial number of years
with a high number of WDL: over 1000 in 1971, 1973, 1976 and again in
1986. After 1986 only twice has the score approached 500 WDL. In
Denmark, the peaks are in 1973, 1985 and (perhaps against the general
trend) 1998. The Danish levels are lower than in Finland, but higher than
in both Norway and Sweden. However, both Norway and (especially)
Sweden experienced a small increase in the 1980s. More recently, with the
exception of Denmark in 1998, all four countries have been approaching
approximately the same low level. If Norway and Sweden had more
stable industrial relations in the 1970s than Denmark and especially
Finland, this difference has been completely levelled after the year 2000.
The trend for the British Isles (Ireland and the UK, see graph 1B) is
almost identical, and in reality very close to Finnish experience. Turbu-
lent industrial relations in the 1970s became more ‘peaceful’ in the 1980s,
and in the 1990s conflict levels became as low as in the central European
countries, a trend which has continued in the 2000s. For the UK, the
figure shows the big labour disputes, partly in the 1970s up to the point
in 1979 when the Labour government was replaced by a series of Conser-
vative governments, the downward trend becoming interrupted of course
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TABLE 2. Annual Average Strike Participation per 1000 Employees by
Decade, 1970–2003
Country 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2003
DK 41.4 39.5 39.6 26.3
FI 174.5 136.0 38.3 28.2
NO 4.0 13.6 10.2 11.4
SE 4.9 28.4 7.4 5.4
IE 34.2 37.3 11.9 12.3
UK 70.6 47.7 8.5 14.1
AT na 4.2 4.9 2.7
DE na na 4.3 3.7
CH 0.3 0.2 0.8 3.7
FR 90.2 6.5 0.8 0.6
BE 23.3 7.8 3.4 2.8
NL 5.1 3.8 4.7 3.0
PT na 17.7 17.8 8.6
IT 491.4 318.9 91.3 112.9
ES 221.0 271.3 173.3 162.8
Average 96.8 66.6 27.8 26.6
Note: na = not available.
Source: ILO.
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FIGURE 1. WDL per 1000 Employees per Year
in 1984–5 by the miners’ strike. The return of Labour to government has
not broken this trend. The UK seems, however surprisingly, almost to
have attained industrial ‘peace in our time’.
In north-western continental Europe (graph 1C) a similar trend can be
seen, in both France and Belgium. The Netherlands has a lower level. The
graph does show a rather different structure for industrial conflict, since
the peaks are certainly not as high as in Scandinavia or the British Isles, and
the period since 1982 seems very peaceful and even, excepting one ‘blip’ in
the Netherlands in 1995. Furthermore, there are indications of an increas-
ing trend in France in the most recent years, something which places France
marginally higher on the aggregate scale than the other countries shown
here, and also higher than the UK (see also Figure 2D).
As for southern continental Europe (graph 1D), it can be seen that
Spain and Italy had an extremely high level in the 1970s, as mentioned
earlier, but in this case there has been a very sharp drop, even though
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FIGURE 2. Average WDL per Year per 1000 Employees, by Decade, 1970–2003
Spain has maintained a level of industrial conflict that almost corresponds
to Belgium and France in the 1970s. Portugal on the other hand has quite
peaceful industrial relations. What is apparent, especially for Spain, is a
pattern of ‘waves’ and very big disputes: The first ones appear in the wake
of democratization after the death of Franco, but again in 1988 and in the
beginning of the 1990s significant highpoints occur, with over 600 WDL
(for a discussion, see Rigby and Marco Aledo, 2001). The Italian pattern
has quite different origins and explanations, probably partly connected
to the state’s role as a major employer (see Franzosi, 1995).
Finally, we have central continental Europe: Germany, Switzerland and
Austria (graph 1E). The level for these three countries is extremely low,
and it has been that way throughout the post-war era. This may be a
surprise to some, since sometimes major industrial conflict erupts and
receives substantial media coverage, as in the case of the Opel workers in
Germany protesting in October 2004 against the outsourcing of jobs. The
numbers, however, show that leaving aside these occasional major
disputes, German industrial relations and those of Austria (until 2002)
and Switzerland, too, are hardly ever marked by industrial conflict. Even
here, certain years clearly appear as highpoints. In Germany, these
occurred in 1971, 1978 and 1984. The latter was the year of big labour
battles caused by the demand for the implementation of the 35-hour
week. As we know, the trade union movement was at least partly vic-
torious in these battles. Today these accomplishments are being rolled
back in Germany, but that is a different story. Austria did, however, break
its peaceful record completely in 2003: a number of very large conflicts
erupted, in the main political strikes against the government’s planned
pension reforms. The Austrian Trade Union Confederation, the ÖGB,
organized a number of very large protest strikes (similar to those
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Source: ILO.
common in France), the most far-reaching since the Second World War.
Added to this, there were major strike outbreaks in the railways and
Austrian Airlines, resulting in an aggregate loss of 1.3 million working
days, or 400 WDL per 1000 employees.10
Across western Europe as a whole, there is a clear picture of conver-
gence and a general decline in industrial conflict. In the 1970s, countries
like Italy, Spain, Ireland, the UK and Finland had a very high level, while
Denmark, Belgium and France were in the middle group; today the level
is much more similar and overall much lower. Convergence is the
predominant trend, and the days of high numbers of WDL are over. This
does not imply that major conflicts have disappeared, though.
A different way of viewing this development — a way that focuses
especially on the differences between the European countries — is to
look at rankings. If there is a general downward trend in strike activity,
it is interesting to see whether this trend influences all countries in equal
measure, or if some countries change place over the decades. Thus, in the
1970s (Figure 2A) Spain and Italy were positioned at the top, with the
UK, Finland and Ireland at a high medium level, Denmark, Belgium and
France in the middle, and Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Norway and Germany all at the very low end. Does this
pattern persist? To some extent it does.
In the 1980s (Figure 2B) the league table is still headed by the same five
countries (Spain, Italy, Finland, the UK and Ireland), while in the middle,
countries like Sweden and Norway have moved somewhat up the scale
from their very low levels in the 1970s. Maybe the ‘resurgence of class
conflict’ came a bit later here? Otherwise, the overall ranking has not
changed much. (Note that the vertical axis on each graph 2A to 2D is
scaled differently, to accommodate the continuing overall decline in
WDL.)
In the 1990s (Figure 2C), Spain was still the most strike-prone country,
but some large conflicts in Denmark and Finland moved these two
countries to second and third place. In Denmark, just one official conflict
(almost a general strike) resulted in a total of 1178 WDL per 1000
employees, the highest number for any European country since 1990.
The UK, France and Portugal, on the other hand, had become much more
peaceful. Also, Norway moved up the scale, not because of increased
Norwegian strike activity, but because strike levels dropped faster in
most other countries.
Finally, in the 2000s (Figure 2D, averaging only the four years for
which data are available) — with the lowest general level for WDL — we
again find Spain, Italy and Finland among the top five, but now Norway
is among the ‘top’ countries, as a result of a very large conflict in 2000.
Also, a novelty, Austria has taken the second place that was occupied by
Denmark in the 1990s. At the very bottom, the least strike-ridden
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countries are (in ascending order): Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Germany, Belgium and Portugal.
A general conclusion on the patterns of cross-national variation would
be that while some countries persist in their position in the league table,
at the high (Spain, Italy and Finland) or the low end (Germany, Switzer-
land, the Netherlands and to some extent Portugal), others do change
places and significantly so. Denmark is for most of this period in the
middle, but was high-ranking in the 1990s; the UK used to be one of the
most strike-ridden, but since the 1990s is now in the middle or just below;
while Norway seems to have moved relatively in the opposite direction.
Austria is a complete surprise.
The Overall Decline
Finally, this article discusses two aspects of the patterns detected: first,
potential explanatory factors behind the decline in strikes; and second,
some possible considerations concerning the still prevalent country
differences. Some of the explanations suggested in the literature are as
follows:
• Declining union density: The most evident explanation is the general
weakening of trade union organization in Europe, first and foremost
reflected in the decline in density. This decline is described in many
sources (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000; Visser, 1994; for the USA, see,
for example Kaufman, 2004: 53), but it cannot really be the only
explanatory factor. For even in countries with relatively stable union
densities, strike levels have dropped significantly.
• Declining collective bargaining coverage: Coverage has declined in
some countries: in Germany in the period just from 1995 to 2001 from
83 to 71 percent in the west and from 73 to 56 percent in the east; and
in the UK in the period from 1984 to 1998 from 66 to 42 percent, quite
significant rates of decline.11 But in most other countries, as Traxler
(1994) has shown, there has been no general decline in bargaining
coverage. Countries with extension clauses which are widely used
(such as Austria and France) maintain very high coverage rates, and
most countries with a less legalistic approach to bargaining coverage
(as in Scandinavia) have not experienced this kind of decline.
• Globalization with less state intervention in support of national
employment: The strengthening of the EU internal market, in combi-
nation with the gradually increasing liberalization of global trade
through the WTO, entails less state protection of national companies
and industries and less state financial intervention to protect employ-
ment. In consequence, striking for state support for ailing producers
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(such as shipyards) has much less appeal to workers today than in the
past. At the same time, globalized competition means that some
employees may face losing their work to developing countries, should
they strike too extensively. That globalization plays a role in under-
mining the strength of the labour movement and blunting the strike
weapon is probably true in a general sense.
• Sectoral and occupational changes: It has long been argued that the
change from manufacturing to the service economy, and the associated
trend in employment from manual worker to salaried employee,
adversely affects solidarity and militancy. In fact the causal relation-
ship is ambiguous. Increased public employment may have increased
the tendency to strike (because of high centralization on the part of the
employer, and a high degree of employment security); conversely,
increases in the private service sector and the ‘knowledge economy’
may pull in the opposite direction. The growing prevalence of priva-
tization may thus have contributed to a downward trend in strikes, but
this can only have been a major factor in the recent period.
• Individualization: This more general sociological factor may also
contribute, although it is of course difficult to say why today’s
employees should have become much more individualistic, and when
such a change took place. However, a change in the balance of risks
and opportunities may make strikes a less attractive option for indi-
vidualistically oriented employees, with a higher estimate of the sacri-
fices involved and a lower expectation of gains.
The ‘Many Cases of Europe’
Why do strike patterns differ in Europe, and why do these differences
seem to persist? Explanations for the persistently high strike levels in
Spain and Italy have been proposed by Franzosi (1995) and Rigby and
Marco Aledo (2001). While these authors point to several important
causal factors, the most important appears to be the fact that striking
plays an almost integral role in sectoral bargaining. In other countries,
such as the UK and in Scandinavia, pay bargaining including unofficial
strikes typically takes place at workplace level; this means that when
employees do strike, it is only in a minority of companies and thus the
toll in WDL is much smaller. Another factor seems to be political strikes,
which have all but disappeared in northern Europe, but which are still a
fact of life in Mediterranean countries. It is tempting also to mention the
very high employment security for workers in Spain and Italy (a legacy
of corporatism), which makes it rather less risky for workers to go on
strike, and also results in conflict over attempts to introduce more labour
market flexibility.
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At the other end of the spectrum are the countries with very low levels
of WDL, both in absolute and relative terms: Germany, Austria (until
2002), Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and to some extent also
Portugal. These are countries where there is no tradition of large politi-
cal strikes and where sectoral bargaining generally takes place with strikes
only few and far between. There are exceptions: Germany in particular
does have intermittent sectoral disputes, resulting in individual years with
a larger number of WDL, but even then the size of such disputes rarely
results in levels approaching the peaks recorded in southern Europe or in
Scandinavia. It is interesting that the most recent English-language intro-
duction to German industrial relations makes only a few passing refer-
ences to the issue of industrial conflict (Müller-Jentsch and Weitbrecht,
2003). One part of the explanation for the extraordinary labour peace in
Germany (and some other countries in this group) might be the strong
works council system, which gives employees much more say in the
everyday business of their companies, and thus makes striking ‘against
oneself’ appear pointless.
Finally, we have the countries in the ‘middle range’, where there the
level of WDL is significant, but not overwhelming. These include France,
Ireland, the UK and all four Scandinavian countries. Here, strikes are still
common either in the recurring processes of local workplace pay bargain-
ing, or as a political means of protest (or both). However, resort to strikes
in either case is episodic and infrequent, contrary to the pattern in Spain
and Italy. Trade unions and employers’ associations therefore constantly
monitor any conflicts in order to contain the eruptions that do occur,
something which in France is left to the politicians.
It is worth noting that in these countries, despite very different insti-
tutional arrangements in industrial relations, levels of industrial conflict
in terms of WDL are today almost indistinguishable. France has a consti-
tutional right to strike, the Scandinavian countries have an embargo on
strikes and lock-outs while a collective agreement is in force, while the
UK has neither of these. Apparently, institutional differences are not a
major influence on the occurrence of industrial conflict. This is surpris-
ing, since many observers argue that the legislative framework strongly
influences the level and pattern of strikes. In the USA, for example,
public-sector strike bans have been shown to have significant damping
effects (Hebdon and Stern, 2003). Yet in Europe, if the workers wish to
strike, the specific national institutional rules are apparently of little
significance. This however can hardly be the truth.
One might argue that high levels of striking, as in the 1970s, are
unhealthy and self-defeating in the globalized economy which we have
today. As with the individual right to quit a job, we consider collective
action a basic democratic right and would consider it an infringement of
individual and democratic rights if politically this were removed. On the
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other hand, when the individual employee quits (without another job
at hand), he or she always runs a risk and doing so repeatedly can be self-
defeating. So the right to strike is there and is important, but extensive
use is a symptom of defects in the industrial relations system.
That is why it is fundamentally wrong to say, for example, that a Scan-
dinavian country such as Denmark has especially peaceful industrial
relations, as it is sometimes claimed by defenders of ‘the Danish model’
(Due et al., 1994). As Stokke has emphasized (1999: 28–30), industrial
conflict in the Scandinavian countries displays a level quite close to most
other European countries.
Conclusion: The Novel Calculus of Industrial Conflict
But what do the generally falling trends in industrial conflict mean? Will
it wither away in a not too distant future? Are strikes an extremely out-
dated way of fighting? Will there be ‘peace in our time’? Or will
companies also in the future have to balance on the risk of conflict, when
the collective agreements are to be renewed, or when the local wage nego-
tiations take place? Will the right to strike have to be exercised once in a
while if we are not to forget about it completely? Can situations still
occur, where the strike as a form of action still today and in the future
will be an effective and legitimate expression of the collective interest or
collective protest of a specific group?
One might believe in ‘peace in our time’. The strike figures are now
extremely small. The average European strike level in the 2000s is 53
WDL annually for every 1000 employees (who each work approximately
225 days a year); the loss of workdays due to strikes in other words makes
up just under 0.02 percent of all possible workdays or less than two per
ten thousand!
On the other hand, it is also easy to see from the data given that the
level of conflict in most countries seems to have declined sharply from
the 1970s to the 1990s, but from then on has not fallen much further. One
might interpret this trend in industrial conflict in Europe as stabilization
at a far lower level than in the past, particularly in the most strike-prone
countries. The continued occurrence of spectacular strikes, for example
in connection with workplace closures or outsourcing, is something that
will prevent dispute levels from falling towards zero. Such actions bring
the attention of the public to processes that hit the employees, who have
few other ways of gaining the attention of the media.
We discussed earlier some explanations for the secular decline in strike
activity since the 1970s. We must also ask for explanations for the
substantial national differences which remain evident, even if cross-
national differences have reduced considerably over time. While it is
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(2)
158
impossible to propose detailed causal explanations here, some hypothe-
ses can be suggested, based both on the literature and upon the recent
changes in industrial conflict patterns. They are summarized in Table 3.
• Unemployment levels play a substantial role in the economic literature,
for example in the Ashenfelter and Johnson model (1969).12 Judging
from the patterns, it is quite clear, however, that neither the decline in
industrial conflict nor the cross-national variation could be explained
by unemployment. While industrial conflict fell in concert with
increasing unemployment in the 1970s, the recovery of employment
in the 1980s and onwards was not accompanied by increasing strike
activity, neither generally nor in those countries benefiting most from
labour market improvement.
• Union density and bargaining coverage may have had a slight effect on
industrial conflict levels: both have been declining, especially density,
and this trend has not been reversed. As for the variation, however, it
is certainly difficult to discern a connection between any of these two
factors and industrial conflict: Both France and Germany have high
bargaining coverage, but their levels of industrial conflict vary substan-
tially.
• Labour law and changes in the legal framework have received
considerable attention in the literature (Elgar and Simpson, 1993;
Hebdon and Stern, 1998, 2003). Clearly, different national systems’
labour law can be expected to influence the variation in patterns and
levels of conflict between European countries, though as noted previ-
ously this effect is far from straightforward.
• Globalization and the reduction in national employment protection, as
discussed earlier, may be important in explaining the overall decline in
industrial conflict levels. However, there is no evidence that differen-
tial exposure to international economic forces can help explain cross-
national variations in WDL.
• Embeddedness or history: national traditions of either high or low
conflict may become established over time and shape the behaviour of
the industrial relations actors. Within countries, one may likewise
observe such learned patterns in particular companies or industries.
This does seem to be an important factor, shaping expectations of what
is legitimate and effective.
Institutional factors may be judged to play a substantial role: legal–
regulative institutions affect the dynamics of industrial conflict, while
normative or cultural–cognitive institutions play a role in explaining
national variation (see Scott, 2001: 52). In sum, strikes are often based on
and have to be understood as rational calculations, embedded in an insti-
tutional system, which to a large extent affects the actual calculation: not
necessarily economic, however, for calculations may be value-based
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(Crouch, 1982; Hyman, 1972; Hyman and Brough, 1975). Industrial
conflict may result from frustrations over large negative enforced
conditions, for example mass lay-offs in the case of declining markets,
often as a futile, yet comprehensible cry for help. Not all participants in
industrial conflict will agree on the calculation, but on these occasions the
majority normally rules, since collective action otherwise becomes virtu-
ally impossible.
Calling participants’ deliberations and reflections on strike action
‘rational calculations’ may appear overdone: according to some estimates,
a strike lasting more than four days will virtually always represent a
negative cost–benefit calculus (Metcalf et al., 1983: 185–91). Protests
against mass lay-offs may be an exception: workers are reacting, because
they feel that the attention of the public needs to become directed toward
the phenomenon. Another explanation might be that the union represen-
tatives — confronted with a sizeable setback, for example major job
losses — may decide that the least-worst option is to fight and lose rather
than not fight at all.13
Consideration of rational calculation makes it possible to expect that
there will be decreased strike activity as markets become globalized and
outsourcing of jobs is made much easier. Workplaces are simply much
less protected by national borders than they were in the 1970s. It also
becomes fair to expect European nations to move towards convergence,
with their strike patterns becoming more similar.
As a fundamental civic right the right to strike is still significant, but
the actual occurrence of strikes can definitely not be seen as a simple
expression of either the strength or the weakness of the labour
movement, as Korpi and Shalev (1979) have cogently explained. They
must, however, be seen as an expression of the embedding of the actors
in nationally specific negotiation relations, and their more or less rational
deliberations and reflections within these.
Strikes may presumably always be seen as the beginning of a process,
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TABLE 3. Hypothetical Effects of Institutional Factors in Explaining Strike
Trends and Cross-national Variations
Decline Variation
Unemployment 0 0
Union density (+) 0
CB coverage (+) 0
Labour law (changes in) (+) +
Changes in market protection + 0
Embeddedness + +
Note: Effects are denoted as 0 = no effect; (+) = slight effect; + = clear effect.
not the end. By conducting a strike, a collective of employees can set a
new agenda or put new issues on the existing agenda, often in the context
of establishing (or improving) a collective agreement. That way strikes
have often been used. However, one cannot in every case strike one’s way
to victory. The victories are won at the negotiating table, where the strike
threat may be a useful card to play. This card instantly loses much of its
value, however, when it is actually played. Negotiation victories usually
involve concessions by both sides. The reciprocity of the negotiation
process becomes far more difficult in the context of strikes or lock-outs,
when feelings are riding high, and the parties may have difficulties acting
and deliberating rationally. If the strike may still be seen as a countervail-
ing power resource for employees faced with the superior power
resources of employers, the waning of industrial conflict is indeed lamen-
table. But if it is a function of employees finding other ways and means
to express their demands, a decrease in industrial conflict may be less
regrettable. Nevertheless, the strike is still a significant civic right, but
more as an emergency resource than as an ‘everyday right’.
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NOTES
1 For a discussion of industrial conflict in eastern Europe, see Kubicek, 2004:
34–7 and Welz and Kauppinen, 2005.
2 These data are now available via http://www.ilo.org, more specifically the
statistics are at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. Data for employment in Germany
are not available from ILO, but have been taken from OECD: http://www1.
oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp. A more detailed
appraisal of sources and data is found in Scheuer, 2005: 36–9, available in pdf
format from the author or at http://diggy.ruc.dk:8080/bitstream/1800/1160/
1/Nr.+1.pdf.
3 In a recent book, Crouch, once the co-editor with Pizzorno of ‘The
Resurgence . . .’, has neither strikes nor industrial conflict in his index.
Nevertheless, he does mention the ‘disastrously organized coal-mining
strike’ (2004: 56).
4 Moreover the deal struck between unions and employers, in the ‘September
Compromise’ of 1899 (and maintained in every subsequent version of the
central agreement between the two main confederations) establishes a ‘peace
obligation’ when a collective agreement is in force. This has been judged to
imply that when there is no collective agreement (or when an agreement has
expired), the peace clause has also expired or is non-existent, and thus that
employees have the right to strike (Due et al., 1994; Scheuer, 1998; Stokke,
2002).
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5 Public-sector strike bans in the USA have also been shown to have some
effect (see Hebdon and Stern, 1998, 2003).
6 For a discussion of industrial conflict in eastern Europe, see Kubicek (2004:
34–7) and Welz and Kauppinen (2005).
7 These data are now available via http://www.ilo.org; more specifically the
statistics are at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. Data for employment in Germany
are not available from ILO, but have been taken from the OECD:
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp. A more
detailed appraisal of sources and data is found in Scheuer (2005: 36–9),
available in pdf format from the author or at http://diggy.ruc.dk:8080/
bitstream/1800/1160/1/Nr.+1.pdf.
8 ‘Production’ is here taken to be any kind of production, both of material
goods and of immaterial services, whether in the private or the public sector.
9 Note that the scale on the vertical axis in the Figures 1A to 1E is not the
same: the strike level measured as the number of WDL in e.g. France is less
than a third of e.g. the British Isles.
10 See http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/01/feature/at0401203f.html.
11 In the UK private sector from 48 to 25 percent. For Germany, see 
Müller-Jentsch and Weitbrecht (2003: 195); for the UK, see Millward et al.
(2000: 96).
12 For a discussion of this model’s merits in the Italian case, see Franzosi (1995:
30–55).
13 Elster (1989). For yet another explanation, union rescue, see Golden (1997).
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